What is IPC Section 349?
IPC Section 349 sits at the opening of Chapter XVI of the Indian Penal Code, "Of Offences Affecting the Human Body," within the sub-group "Of Criminal Force and Assault" (Sections 349–358). Before the Code addresses when force becomes criminal (Section 350) or what constitutes assault (Section 351), it first establishes precisely what "force" itself means — a foundational building block that every subsequent provision in this cluster relies upon.
The definition is deliberately broad and technical, extending well beyond the everyday sense of physical violence. It captures direct bodily contact, but also indirect methods — arranging for a substance to act on someone without further intervention, or directing an animal to move against them — recognising that force, in a legal sense, is about the effect produced (motion, change of motion, or cessation of motion) and the specific mechanism by which it is caused, not simply visible physical aggression.
Important Update: IPC to BNS Transition
With effect from 1 July 2024, the Indian Penal Code has been replaced by the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 for offences committed on or after that date. Section 349 IPC now corresponds to Section 128 of the BNS, which retains the same substantive definition with updated phraseology, and replaces "First," "Secondly," and "Thirdly" with clauses (a), (b), and (c).
Legal Provision — Text of Section 349 IPC
This provision must be read together with Section 350 (the definition of "criminal force," which builds on this definition by adding the requirement that the force be used without consent, and with the intent or knowledge required for the offence) and Section 351 (the definition of assault). Together, these three definitional provisions establish the terminology used across the remaining offences in this chapter, including Sections 352–358.
Nature & Significance of Section 349
| Nature of Provision | Purely definitional — it explains what "force" means, without creating or punishing any offence itself |
|---|---|
| Core Requirement | Causing motion, change of motion, or cessation of motion, to a person or a substance contacting them |
| Method 1 | By the accused's own bodily power (direct physical action) |
| Method 2 | By positioning a substance so that it later causes motion without further action by anyone |
| Method 3 | By inducing an animal to move, change its motion, or stop moving |
| BNS 2023 Equivalent | Section 128, with the same substance retained |
Because Section 349 is purely definitional, it has no independent classification as cognizable/non-cognizable, bailable/non-bailable, or compoundable — those categories attach entirely to the specific offences (such as criminal force or assault) that this definition feeds into once its elements are established on the facts of a case.
How Section 349 Relates to Neighbouring Provisions
- Section 349 (this section) defines "force" in general terms — the physical act of causing motion, change, or cessation of motion.
- Section 350 defines "criminal force," building on this definition by adding the requirements that the force be used intentionally, without the other person's consent, and with a specific harmful purpose or knowledge.
- Section 351 defines "assault," which involves a gesture or preparation intending or knowing it likely to cause another to apprehend criminal force, without the force actually needing to be applied.
- Section 353 punishes assault or criminal force to deter a public servant from discharging their duty, one of several aggravated forms of criminal force punished later in the chapter.
Important Cases on Section 349
Chandrika Sao v. State of Bihar, (1967) Cr LJ 261 (SC)
An assistant superintendent of commercial taxes made a surprise visit to inspect a shop's account books. Finding two sets of books, he began examining them, whereupon the accused suddenly snatched both books away from him. The accused was charged under Section 353 (assault or criminal force to deter a public servant from discharging their duty), which depends on the underlying definitions of "force" and "criminal force" in Sections 349 and 350. The case illustrates how even a sudden snatching act — momentary physical contact causing motion of an object away from another person — satisfies the definition of force under this section.